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at one stroke Sir Edward Grey showed up Germany's designs, secured an opportunity to urge upon Belgium a timely resistance, united the Cabinet and the country against Germany, intervened in good season for the defense of the balance of power, and came to the aid of the Entente soon enough to be sure of the gratitude of Russia and France; yet he had also succeeded in holding off both sides long enough to try the effect of every inducement for peace he could bring forward.

As we get farther away from that fateful day, August 1, 1914, we are disposed, I think, to look deeper and more widely into the natures and ambitions and fears of peoples, while laying less stress upon the proximate causes of this war and their sequence. In this book we have a careful and fair record of the latter: we have also in chapter XI., in a brief forty pages, a study of the former which everyone should read who cares for European politics largely treated.

T. S. WOOLSEY.

The History of Twelve Days, July 24th to August 4th, 1914: being an Account of the Negotiations preceding the Outbreak of War, based on the Official Publications. By J. W. HEADLAM, M.A. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. Pp. xxiv, 412.)

MR. HEADLAM begins his *History of Twelve Days* with the sentence: "It was August in the year 1913." The ensuing account of the London Conference, preceded by the long drawn out crisis in the Balkans, gives him an opportunity to employ his lucid powers of historical narrative in a most interesting account of the relations between Serbia and Austria and the diplomatic duel between Austria and Russia for the control of the little Balkan kingdom.

When he reaches the opening scene of the great conflict which followed "a crime as purposeless as it was cruel and wicked" (p. 17), he says of the accusations which Austria directed against the Serbian government: "That there was any complicity on the part of the Serbian Government there is no evidence of any kind put forward, though it is suggested that they had been guilty of criminal negligence in not keeping stricter control over the secret societies" (p. 18). He points out how the Austrian note was published within a few hours of its presentation so that any redress offered by Serbia would appear to be as a result of the Austrian threats (p. 29). He appears to be justified when he says that the demands of the note "were drawn up with the deliberate object of making them such that they could not be at once and unconditionally accepted" (p. 30). "The real criticism of the note", he truly says, "seems to be that it confused, and intentionally confused, two different things—a political agitation and a criminal conspiracy" (p. 32). The inevitable conclusion reached, that Austria wanted war with Serbia, brings up for a later chapter the discussion of whether Austria also wanted war with Russia; but instead of devoting the succeeding chapter to the discussion of this question, as would seem log-

ical, Mr. Headlam prefers to bring early to the reader's attention the preponderant rôle of Germany, which corresponds with her responsibility. After pointing out the favorable situation from the German point of view for the launching of a conflict, he says that the German government cannot enter into a war "unless it is assured of the vigorous support of the people" (p. 43). He considers that among a considerable portion the feeling was growing up that the war was unavoidable, and if unavoidable it was better that it should come as soon as possible. I believe with him that the Germans would doubtless have preferred "a peaceful solution, provided that a peaceful solution could be obtained by the submission of Russia", and that "this is what in reality was meant by the phrase 'localization of the conflict'" (p. 53), upon which Germany took her stand. After thus explaining the causes of Germany's policy of localization, the succeeding chapter discusses the relations between Russia and Austria, and the necessity which Russia felt of intervening to protect Serbia. This is followed by an interesting chapter on the attempted mediation of the less interested powers, with the conclusion

that the German Government had determined that no mediation of any kind should be allowed, that no request to Austria to suspend her action should be permitted, and that it had been determined between Austria and Germany that war against Serbia should be pressed on with the greatest precipitation, so as to crush Serbia before any interference, diplomatic or military, could be arranged (p. 137).

A separate chapter is devoted to the intervention of the German emperor, upon which great emphasis is laid; but this is unsafe ground for the historian at present.

Passing on to Russia's mobilization against Austria, it is truly said:

No action has been the subject of such severe criticism as that of the Russians in calling in the reserves throughout their whole Empire. The Germans have fixed on this as the sole real cause of the war, and have built up a theory that at this moment proposals of a nature satisfactory to all were on the point of being put forward, and that it was Russian mobilisation alone which prevented them being brought to a satisfactory conclusion (pp. 220-221).

Yet in a similar situation Germany, when confronted by the danger of war with Russia, immediately mobilized the whole of her forces on *both* fronts,

and though France had throughout shown the greatest restraint and had carefully avoided every word or action which could have been interpreted in a provocative sense, Germany immediately massed her troops on the French frontier and addressed an ultimatum to her. In the light of this, what hypocrisy is it on the part of the German Government to complain of the Russian action! (p. 224).

Attempts at mediatory action continued up to the very last day, when Germany, instead of communicating Austria's answer to accept the mediation proposed by Sir Edward Grey, "broke off negotiations and declared war" (p. 238). Then the great European conflict was opened by the invasion of Luxemburg and then of Belgium.

This preliminary study, which has brought us to the very invasion of Belgium, permits the author to focus attention upon that great central fact in its relation to British intervention. The consideration of the latter he preceeds by an historical study of Great Britain and the Entente Cordiale, while a history of the neutrality of Belgium prepares us for the never-to-be-forgotten horror of this greatest crime against the law of nations, the violation of Belgian neutrality. This last part of the book, more especially the chapter on British intervention, is peculiarly interesting as a British historian's portrayal and interpretation of Great Britain's action at this supreme crisis in her national life. The author frankly confesses: "Writing in the middle of the great war in which the future of the country is endangered by an enemy more powerful and more implacable than any that it has before met, it would be foolish to claim the merit of impartiality", but we cannot commend the state of mind which would declare: "Had I found in the course of the work that the result would be unfavourable to the justice and honesty of the British cause, I should have adopted the only possible course and kept silent till the war was over" (preface, p. viii). But for its absolute frankness, such a statement would cast suspicion upon the whole work, for how are we to know that a man who is governed by such considerations may not suppress in all of his work that which he perceives might lead to an unfavorable judgment on his country? The reviewer believes that it is the better part of patriotism and loyalty as a citizen to set forth the truth as it is found. When there are more citizens in each country to lay bare the truth, however repulsive it may be, to the eyes of an oligarchy drunk with power, the presence of such historians will restrain their transgressions against the law of nations and the rights of humanity. This said, we must acknowledge that Mr. Headlam gives evidence of a very fair consideration of his material. He has selected the most striking passages which give expression to the general current of the negotiations, and he has combined them in a most skillful manner. The differences in type set off clearly the quotations. He has employed those convenient marginal headings, by which English books are distinguished, to indicate at once the date of the document and the name of the diplomat, but the reader is left without any adequate check on the fairness of his treatment, since he does not give all the citations which relate to the particular matter. In view of the admitted bias of the writer both because of his nationality and of the period at which he is writing, the book can never claim to be anything more than a superior kind of brief for England. As an interesting and fair statement of the British point of view, it is especially

valuable for the account of the formation of the Triple Entente and the considerations which led to British intervention. A good example of this is seen, when the author adopts that widespread and untenable English theory that when Great Britain gave her adhesion to the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg, she "only undertook an obligation not herself to violate it" (p. 335).

The reviewer agrees with Mr. Headlam when he says of Sir Edward Grey's action in not promising support to Russia from the beginning:

It would, indeed, have been impossible for him to do so. Let us consider what would have happened had he acted in this manner. He could not have been sure that war would have been avoided; it is now at best a probability but not a certainty; then it was only a possibility. But had war none the less come about, in what a situation would he have been placed! How could he have come to the country and asked for their support in a war waged, as this would have appeared to be, in support of Serbia against Austria and in a matter with which this country had no interest? Even had the Cabinet supported him—and this it would not have done without losing many members—had he even secured a majority in the House of Commons, the opposition in the country to such a policy would have been so strong and determined that the country could not have thrown its full strength into the war. How would it have been possible to appeal to men to serve in the army for a war undertaken in this manner? The country would have been divided and half-hearted; neither men nor the money would have been available, and inevitable disaster would have resulted (pp. 306-307).

Again he commends the able manner in which Sir Edward Grey handled the matter of Belgian neutrality and foiled the German attempts to secure the promise of British non-intervention. In reference to Belgian neutrality Mr. Headlam says: "Even had this difficulty been out of the way it would, however, have been almost impossible to formulate all the conditions necessary to be observed if this country was to enter into any engagement not to take part in the war" (p. 331), but all these discussions brought out the fact that "the one essential matter which was at issue between the two governments was the invasion of Belgium" (p. 339).

The greatest defect in the book and one which it is hard to overlook in the case of a scholar, is the trivial and inadequate index; furthermore it is hardly excusable, where the author has access to the original German documents, to reproduce the uncouth solecisms which the English scholars of the German Foreign Office have foisted upon the English-speaking world, such for example as, "I told the general that his statement placed me before a riddle" (p. 184); nor should the name of the Serbian prime minister be "Pashitch" on page 19, while it is given in another form "Pasić" in the first line of page 67. Such evidences of haste are probably due to the desire to produce the volume without delay.

When some German historian gives the story from the German point of view, it will be interesting again to compare the two accounts. The book is both interesting and instructive and will remain a valuable exposition of the causes of the war from the viewpoint of a trained and critical British observer. In all probability nearly all the author's conclusions will stand the test of impartial criticism and the publication of material now inaccessible.

ELLERY C. STOWELL.

A History of the Japanese People from the Earliest Times to the End of the Meiji Era. By Captain F. BRINKLEY, R.A., with the collaboration of Baron KIKUCHI. (New York and London: The Encyclopaedia Britannica Company. 1915. Pp. xi, 784.)

IN this last of his valuable works on Japan, the late Captain Brinkley (for the share of his collaborator, Baron Kikuchi, in the preparation of the present volume is inconsiderable) undertakes to cover the entire historic period of Japan down to 1912, a subject too vast for a single writer or reviewer to compass with even success. As the success of an historical writer must depend upon his equipment for his task, the critic of this work is compelled to inquire into the extent of the materials its author has used and into the range of his personal interest in his many-sided subject.

As regards his material, Brinkley cannot be said to have made a full use of his large knowledge of Japanese for the exploitation of even the more easily accessible editions of sources. Nor has he availed himself half as much as he should of such results of studies by special workers as are in print in Japanese or in English; some of the well-established facts, the knowledge of which would have materially influenced many of his statements, have been inexcusably neglected. These charges might appear too serious in the case of an historical work making so large claims as this, but they seem more than justified by the consideration, among others, that Brinkley's work, such as it is, is based upon a greater amount of literature, though not of primary sources, than any other of the same kind except Murdoch's.

Few scholars might be expected to possess so comprehensive a training and interest as to enable them to feel at home in all phases of the complex career of an old nation. One may, however, ask if Brinkley's failings as a catholic historian are not most evident along some of the most important lines of his work; his weakness seems manifest on the cultural side in its deeper features, and is still more lamentable on the entire institutional side. His treatment of religion, its social reactions, and its relation to the higher forms of national art and letters is hardly less disappointing than that of Murdoch; and in his comprehension of the institutional growth, though he often discusses it at length, the